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Résumé: Cet article s'intéresse à l'évolution du concept de commerce équitable. Nous 
proposons un modèle simple en vue de donner des arguments théoriques dans le 
débat sur la vente de produits équitables dans la grande distribution. 
L'hypothèse principale est que certains consommateurs sont prêts à payer un 
prix plus élevé pour acheter un produit équitable. Nous mettons en évidence que 
les produits équitables ont plus de chance d'être dans les rayons des 
supermarchés si le certificateur du label équitable a pour objectif de maximiser 
les quantités certifiées plutôt que le prix payé aux producteurs. Nous soulignons 
également que la variable clé dans le choix du revendeur de vendre ou non des 
produits équitables n'est pas le pourcentage de consommateurs prêts à payer 
pour un bien équitable, mais combien ces consommateurs sont prêts à payer pour 
ce type de produit. 
 
Abstract: This paper focuses on  a sustainable perspective of Fair Trade concept. We 
propose a simple model to provide some theoretical arguments in the debate 
about the sale of Fair Trade labelled goods in the large-scale distribution. The 
main hypothesis is related to the observation that some consumers are willing to 
pay a premium for Fair Trade products. We show that Fair Trade products are 
more likely to be on retailer's shelves if the Fair Trade certifier's objective is to 
maximize quantities labelled rather than the price paid to producers. We also 
underline that the key variable in the retailer's choice  to sell the Fair Trade 
product is not the percentage of consumers who are willing to pay a Fair Trade 
good, but how much the Fair Trade likers are willing to pay for it. 
 
Mots clés : Dicrimination en prix, différentiation des produits, revente. 
 
Key Words : Price discrimination, product differentiation, retailing. 
 
Classification JEL: D21, L22, L31.  
 
 
                                                          
1 INRA-ALISS & Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique. E-mail address: poret@ivry.inra.fr 
2 INRA-ALISS & Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique. 
1 Introduction
The growth of Fair Trade brings a large debate about the insertion of Fair
Trade products into the conventional distribution network.1 Indeed, Fair
Trade organizations have a double purpose: to help producers from the South
to improve their living conditions and to transform gradually international
trade relations. Fair Trade being an alternative approach to conventional
international trade, its consistency with the insertion of the Fair Trade prod-
ucts into the large-scale distribution appears as a great concern.
Fair Trade deﬁnes itself as a trading partnership, based on dialogue, trans-
parency and respect, which seeks greater equity in international trade. It
contributes to sustainable development by oﬀering better trading conditions
to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers, especially
in the South.2 In a practical hand, the Fair Trade movement attempts to
eliminate middlemen in the chain and to guarantee a higher price to small
producers.
Fair Trade started as a grassroots movement in the late 1960s in Europe.
The aim was to alleviate poverty in the South by building direct, sustain-
able relationships with disadvantaged producers and providing fair access to
markets in the North, using a strategy of trade, not aid. The alternative
trade organizations (Non-Governmental Organizations) created a parallel re-
tail network with specialty stores managed as cooperatives and staﬀed by
volunteers.3 In 1988, a Mexican cooperative of coﬀee producers, who re-
quested help in marketing their products in Europe, and a collaborator of a
Dutch NGO conceived the idea of a Fair Trade certiﬁcation (Renard, 2003).
Products bought, traded and sold respecting Fair Trade conditions would
qualify for a label that would make them stand out among ordinary prod-
ucts on store shelves and would allow any company to get involved in Fair
Trade. Thus, the Max Havelaar label was established in the Netherlands.
In the late 1980s, similar non-proﬁt Fair Trade organizations began label-
ing Fair Trade products to facilitate their entry into conventional markets in
other countries (Raynolds, 2000). In 1997, the creation of the Fair Trade La-
1See, for example, the virtual symposium of some French Fair Trade actors
in march 2004,  La grande distribution : l'avenir du commerce équitable ? 
http://www.changerdere.com/accueil/.
2IFAT (International Federation for Alternative Trade) http://www.ifat.org
3Oxfam and Twin Trading (Great Britain), Stichting Ideele Import (Netherlands) or
Artisans du Monde (France) are some alternative trade organizations.
1
beling Organization (FLO) united many of these labeling initiatives. FLO is
now responsible for setting international Fair Trade standards for certifying
production, trade and labeling of a certain number of products.
Fair Trade mainly concerns agriculture and handicraft products, but only
agricultural ones more or less transformed (coﬀee, cocoa, tea, honey, sugar,
rice, bananas, fruit juices,...) can be labeled. A third-party certiﬁcation
agency, member of the FLO network, is in charge of making sure that Fair
Trade criteria are respected.4 The movement is a global network of produc-
ers, wholesalers, retailers, certiﬁcation agencies, and consumers who commit
themselves to the Fair Trade guidelines. Transparency is the core issue at all
the levels of the production and distribution chains. Contrary to the other
certiﬁcation schemes, which focus strictly on conditions at the point of pro-
duction, Fair Trade certiﬁcation is unique in that its criteria cover both trade
and production conditions (Raynolds, 2000).
The label ﬁrst guarantees general criteria.5 The producers have to fol-
low certain agreements to qualify their products as Fair Trade. Small scale
farmers/producers can only be certiﬁed Fair Trade if they have gathered
cooperatives, associations or other organizational entities which are demo-
cratically controlled and contribute to the social and economic development
of its members. The producers must tend towards the use of environmentally
sustainable agricultural practices and a production of quality. Trading stan-
dards stipulate that importers have to pay a price to producers that covers
the costs of sustainable production and living and a premium that small pro-
ducers invest in development. As importers can pay a part of the production
in advance when the producers ask for it, the latter can purchase the neces-
sary raw materials to complete an order without falling into debt. Finally,
traders must establish long-term working relationships and contracts with
producers. Product-speciﬁc standards for each good that determine mini-
mum quality, price, and processing requirements that have to be complied
with, are determined and reviewed by FLO. For instance, Fair Trade coﬀee
producers are guaranteed to earn at least US$1.26 per pound. If the coﬀee
spot price is higher than this rate, importers pay a premium of US$0.05 per
4For example, in the United-States, Fair Trade products bear the Fair Trade Certiﬁed
label and the Fair Trade Federation logo. TransFair USA is the third-party certiﬁer that
places the Fair Trade Certiﬁed label on coﬀee, chocolate, cocoa, tea, bananas, and other
fruits.
5See on the website of FLO-I, http://www.fairtrade.net, to ﬁnd standards in general
and for all goods.
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pound more. Certiﬁed organic coﬀee gets a further premium of US$0.15 per
pound. In 2002, for arabica coﬀees, the diﬀerence between the Fair Trade
price and the New York "C" price was equal on average to nearly US$0.72
per pound (Giovannucci, 2003).
The annual aggregate net retail value of all Fair Trade products sold in
Europe through alternative channels and supermarkets would exceed =C260
million, of which =Cmillion for labeled products (EFTA, 2001). Fair Trade
products are sold in the 2,700 or so worldshops in Europe (18 countries) and
they are available too in more than 43,000 supermarkets throughout Europe
thanks to the labeling schemes. In North America (the US and Canada) and
the Paciﬁc Rim (Australia, New Zealand and Japan) Fair Trade market has
grown more recently and is less developed than the European one, but it is ex-
panding much more rapidly. Total Fair Trade sales in these regions increased
by 37% during 2002, from US$183 million to US$251 million (FTF, 2003).
In 2004, Fair Trade network represented 433 certiﬁed producer organizations
and the number of registered traders increased from 297 from 2003 to 406 at
the end of 2004 (see on the website of FLO-I, http://www.fairtrade.net).
More and more consumers know the concept of Fair Trade and declare in
polls that they are willing to pay a higher price for a product with Fair Trade
criteria. In Germany, according to recent market surveys, almost 37% of the
population are willing to pay a higher price for coﬀee if it is guaranteed that
the beneﬁts are distributed to producers in developing countries. In addition,
40% of Germans believe Fair Trade is a good idea and 11% already buy
TransFair-labelled tea or coﬀee, although the market shares of those products
are no more than respectively 2% and 1%. (EFTA, 2001). In a French study
(AlterEco, 2004), to the question why have you never bought Fair Trade
products? 39.1% of the 495 surveyed people argue the lack of information,
36.7% declare not knowing a retail outlet oﬀering Fair Trade products. At
the upstream of the labeled products network, coﬀee farmers' groups fail to
sell, on average, more than 20% of their production to Fair Trade importers
(Renard, 2005) and the Fair Trade coﬀee, the ﬂagship product of the concept,
accounts for only 0.34% of total coﬀee production. Thus, Fair Trade is curbed
by the lack of market opportunities and its future depends on the consumers'
better knowledge.
The introduction of Fair Trade products in big retail chains is a solution to
this double objective.6 However, given the market and buying powers of large
6For example, in France in 2003, 66.9% of food purchases were made in supermarkets
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retailers, they may impose their conditions: wholesale price cutting pressure,
creation of less strict labels, risk of delisting, lack of long term contracts, and
capture of the most lucrative niche. For some Fair Trade organizations, as
Fédération Artisans du Monde, it is impossible to participate in large-scale
distribution, because retailers are not ethic per se. Fair Trade organizations
should avoid large retailers ran by multinationals who are part of the problem
that Fair Trade is trying to ﬁght against.
We propose a simple model to provide some theoretical arguments in
this debate. In our model, a Fair Trade certiﬁer and a traditional producer
compete to supply their product to a single retailer. The main hypothesis of
our model is that some consumers, called Fair Trade likers, are willing to pay
a premium for Fair Trade products which depends on the producers' revenue.
We thus explain the motivation of a retailer to sell some Fair Trade products
thanks to the discrimination of consumers' demand. We then highlight the
condition of existence of an equilibrium where the Fair Trade product coexists
with the traditional brand product on the retailer's shelves. In particular, we
show how a Fair Trade certiﬁer implements this equilibrium if his preferences
are such that the weight devoted to the price paid to producers is smaller
than the weight he grants to the quantities of Fair Trade product sold. We
underline that the key variable for a retailer to decide to sell the Fair Trade
good is not the percentage of consumers who are willing to pay for it but
how much the Fair Trade likers are willing to pay.
From a theoretical point of view, this paper is related to two branches of
the industrial organization literature: vertical relationships, product diﬀer-
entiation and price discrimination. Indeed, we introduce a situation where
some consumers are willing to pay for a non-tangible attribute of the prod-
uct, the Fair Trade certiﬁcation. The vertical diﬀerentiation is based not
on a physical attribute but on a costless characteristic of the trade relation-
ship. Fair Trade is the object of some theoretical approaches (Adriani and
Becchetti (2002), Becchetti, Solferino (2003), Immordino (2002)), but to our
knowledge the supply of Fair Trade products by retail chains has not yet
been formalized.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the as-
sumptions of the model. Section 3 analyzes the retailer listing choice to sell
either one or both the Fair Trade and the traditional product. Section 4
analyzes the upstream competition between a traditional ﬁrm and the Fair
(INSEE, 2004).
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Trade certiﬁer. In Section 5, we test the robustness of the model by intro-
ducing a change in the speciﬁcation of the premium consumers are willing to
pay for the Fair Trade good. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Demand
On the basis of a sample of 808 Belgian citizens and using conjoint analysis,
De Pelsmacker, Driesen, Rayp (2005) (henceforth referred as DDR), study
the importance of a Fair Trade label in the coﬀee buying decision and the
willingness to pay for such a Fair Trade product. On average, a Fair Trade
label is considered as the second most important coﬀee attribute, behind the
brand and as important as aroma. The authors divide coﬀee buyers into four
segments on the basis of the relative importance they attach to various coﬀee
attributes (Brand, Blending, Flavor, Package, Fair Trade Label). 11% of the
respondents expressed a high preference for Fair Trade label and are named
Fair Trade loversa and, for 40%, called the Fair Trade likers, Fair Trade
label comes out as the most important attribute but not as the prominent
one.7 DDR also evaluates the willingness to pay for a Fair Trade label: 35% of
the respondents are willing to pay a price premium of 10%, 17% a premium
of 20%, and 10% a premium equal to the average actual premium (27%).
Notice that the data exhibit a negative correlation between the amount of
the premium Fair Trade likers are ready to spend and the number of Fair
Trade likers.
Based on this empirical study, we consider two varieties of the same good:
the traditional product and a Fair Trade one. Unless both products have even
qualities, only one good responds to Fair Trade criteria and is thus labeled
by a certiﬁer. We assume that the demand is divided into two segments of
consumers: Fair Trade likers and traditional consumers. Let λ denote the
proportion of Fair Trade likers in the population. When only the traditional
brand is sold in the market, the demand from both traditional consumers
and Fair Trade likers q is simply linear in the price charged, p: q = 1 − p.
Conversely, when both products are available in the market, the demand
from traditional consumers is qt = 1 − pt while Fair Trade likers can move
to the Fair Trade good and their demand is given by qf = 1 + αwf − pf if
7The two other segments are the ﬂavor lovers (24%) and the brand lovers (25%).
5
αwf > pf − pt, where αwf denotes the premium these consumers are ready
to pay for a Fair Trade product. Fair Trade likers are concerned by small
producers' welfare and they are willing to pay a premium for a Fair Trade
product that we assume to be related to the wholesale price wf paid to Fair
Trade producers. This assumption also requires that the information about
the wholesale price paid to small producers is delivered by the certiﬁer to
consumers.8 The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] reﬂects the value granted by Fair
Trade likers to the enhancement of producers' revenue, that is, the wholesale
price they receive. We deﬁne it as the ethical premium parameter.
Notice that our formalization of the demand comes directly from the
DDR analysis: Fair Trade likers are ready to pay a premium for Fair Trade
product.9 An alternative assumption would be to consider that Fair Trade
likers grant a higher quality to a Fair Trade good than to a traditional one
which would come to use a vertical diﬀerentiation model à la Mussa-Rosen.
We come back further on the implications of such an assumption.
2.2 The Oﬀer
Let assume that there is one Fair Trade good produced by small producers
and labeled by a certiﬁer. We assume that the Fair Trade certiﬁer sets the
wholesale price for the Fair Trade product denoted wf on behalf of small
producers she represents. We consider that she acts as a trade union. The
utility of the Fair Trade certiﬁer U(wf , qf ) depends positively on the Fair
Trade wholesale price, which determines the small producers' revenue, also
as on the Fair Trade product quantity sold, which represents the number of
small producers in the Fair Trade network. It is speciﬁed in the following
utilitarian form:
U(wf , qf ) = (wf − wmin)β(qf )1−β,
where β is the certiﬁer's wholesale price preference parameter, with β ∈ [0, 1],
and wmin the minimum wholesale price. Let wmin be equal to the production
8Since 2006, the AFNOR (Accord AC X50-340) which deﬁnes the regulation for Fair
Trade at the European level, has imposed that the minimum prices and criteria recognized
by Fair Trade international federations be explicitly mentioned in the bill of the small and
medium entreprises law.
9Soberman and Parker (2004) propose a similar formalization in a paper devoted to
private labels analysis. They distinguish two types of consumers: product seekers and
brand seekers. The latter are willing to pay a premium for the national brand equal to
the level of advertising realized by the ﬁrm.
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marginal cost that we normalize to zero. When β = 0.5, the utility of the
Fair Trade certiﬁer is equal to the total proﬁt of small producers.
Beside, a single producer oﬀers the traditional product. We voluntarily
avoid a competition eﬀect between traditional ﬁrms.10 The traditional pro-
ducer buys his raw product at the world market price, normalized to zero
and sells his product at a wholesale price denoted wt. The certiﬁer and the
traditional producer compete to supply a single retailer.11 The monopsonist
can list either one or both products and the corresponding retail prices are
denoted pt and pf . To simplify the analysis and without loss of generality,
we normalize to zero the marginal cost of production and retailing for the
two products.
2.3 The Game
We analyze the following four stages game.
In stage 1, the Fair Trade certiﬁer chooses either to supply the retailer or
not: the certiﬁer decides either to be in or out of the market.12
In stage 2, the traditional ﬁrm and the Fair Trade certiﬁer choose simul-
taneously their unit wholesale prices, wt and wf , given their objective.
In stage 3, the retailer chooses her product line. The retailer can either
supply both products (FT) or one product, the traditional (T) or the Fair
Trade (F) product.
In stage 4, the retailer sets retail prices for the product(s). The following
sections solve the game backward.
10For instance, in the coﬀee market, there are four main roasters: Kraft, Nestlé, Procter
& Gamble, Sara Lee who jointly represent 40% of green coﬀee volumes. In France, the
four groups represent more than three-fourths of the roast and ground market (Giovan-
nucci, 2003). In the United States, two brands, Maxwell House (Kraft Foods) and Folgers
(Procter & Gamble), represent 56% of the market (Ramirez-Vallejo, 2002).
11We consider only one retailer, because, in most North countries, the food retailing
is highly concentrated and thus each retailer has a strong market power (see Allain and
Chambolle (2003)).
12If the certiﬁer is out of the market, he implicitly sells his product in specialized stores,
where only the most convinced and involved consumers, the militants of the Fair Trade
concept, go. However this outside option proﬁt is considered as a constant and has no role
in our formalization.
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3 The Retailer's Listing Strategy
To determine the optimal retailer's listing strategy, we solve backward the
fourth and third stage of the game. In the stage 4, the retailer's objective
functions according to the strategy chosen in stage 3 are as follows:
• Strategy (FT)
piRFT (pf , pt, wf , wt) = λ(1+αwf −pf )(pf −wf )+(1−λ)(1−pt)(pt−wt)
(1)
Here, the retailer sells to Fair Trade likers the Fair Trade product and
to the other consumers the traditional brand supplied by the traditional
ﬁrm.
• Strategy (T)
piRT (pt, wt) = (1− pt)(pt − wt) (2)
The retailer sells only the traditional brand. Since the Fair Trade prod-
uct is not available on the market, all consumers buy the traditional
brand.
• Strategy (F)
piRF1(pf , wf ) = [λ(1 + αwf − pf ) + (1− λ)(1− pf )](pf − wf )
when pf < 1
piRF2(pf , wf ) = λ(1 + αwf − pf )(pf − wf )
when pf > 1
(3)
The retailer has chosen to oﬀer only the Fair Trdae product to con-
sumers. Thus, if the retail price is lower than the traditional con-
sumers' reservation price, all consumers buy the Fair Trade product.
If the retail price of the Fair Trade product is higher than the tradi-
tional consumers' reservation price, only the Fair Trade likers buy this
product.
We then characterize the third stage subgame equilibrium where the re-
tailer chooses her product line by comparing her proﬁts, given the wholesale
prices charged by the traditional ﬁrm and the Fair Trade certiﬁer.
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Lemma 1. The retailer's listing choice depends on two wholesale price thresh-
olds of the Fair Trade product
w˜f (wt, α, λ) =
1−√1− (1− α2λ)wt(2− wt)
1− α2λ and ŵf (wt, α) =
wt
1− α.
(i). If wf < w˜f , the retailer sells only the Fair Trade product, at a retail
price such that all consumers buy it (Case F1).
(ii). If w˜f < wf < ŵf , the retailer sells both products (FT).
(iii). If wf > ŵf , the retailer sells only the traditional product (T).
Proof. See the appendix A.
The higher the Fair Trade wholesale price relatively to the traditional
product wholesale price, the less likely the retailer carries the Fair Trade
variety. These results are consistent with the intuition and are derived from
three eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is direct: a greater wholesale price for a product
puts the retailer oﬀ distributing it. The second and third eﬀects are related to
the vertical diﬀerentiation and the retailer's ability to discriminate between
both segments of consumers. As some consumers grant some value to the
producers' revenue, that is, the Fair Trade products' wholesale price, the
retailer can, setting two prices, discriminate between consumers. The second
one is due to the ethical premium as a whole. The third eﬀect is due to the
fact that the ethical premium is itself a function of the Fair trade products'
wholesale price. This eﬀect reduces the negative eﬀect of the ﬁrst one (see
Appendix B)).
Notice here that the alternative assumption of a vertical diﬀerentiation à
la Mussa-Rosen between the Fair Trade and the traditional products would
lead to trivial results. Indeed, the retailer would always have an incentive
to oﬀer both products to consumers and thanks to product diﬀerentiation
the certiﬁer would always realize a positive proﬁt and enter the market. The
assumption of a premium that consumers are willing to pay for the Fair Trade
good is crucial to explain our results. Indeed, both products can coexist
realizing positive proﬁts although their product is homogenous in quality
because, thanks to the Fair Trade premium, there is still a positive demand
at a price strictly higher than 1. Setting a price strictly higher than 1 enables
the certiﬁer to capture a strictly positive demand without competing with
the traditional producer.
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The subgame equilibrium of the stage 3 is represented by Figure 1 with
α = 0.6 and λ = 0.25. The two Fair Trade product's wholesale prices
thresholds are increasing in wt. Moreover, ŵf (wt, α) is increasing in α and
w˜f (wt, α, λ) is decreasing in α and λ. If the Fair Trade likers are willing
to pay more for the Fair Trade product and/or if the number of Fair Trade
likers rises, a retailer who sold only a variety may now rather oﬀers both
varieties of the good. This is because the retailer can better discriminate
between consumers and increase the retail price of the Fair Trade product.
Figure 1: Listing strategies of the retailer
If the Fair Trade wholesale price is very low (wf < w˜f ) in comparison with
the traditional product's wholesale price wt (w˜f < wt), the retailer chooses
to oﬀer only the Fair Trade product. The dominant eﬀect is here the direct
one related to the wholesale price.
For intermediate value of wf (w˜f < wf < ŵf ), the retailer sells both
products, even if the Fair Trade product's wholesale price is lower than the
10
traditional brand one. Indeed, in the strategy (F,T),
pf − pt = 1
2
(wf − wt + αwf ) .
This is because the retail price of the Fair Trade product can be higher than
the retail price of the traditional product, since the ethical premium allows
the retailer to discriminate consumers. In addition, even when the wholesale
price of the Fair Trade product is greater than the one of the traditional
product, the beneﬁt of the discrimination is higher than its cost. This is all
the more true when the consumer grants a high value to the wholesale price
received by producers. Indeed, ŵf tends towards +∞ when α tends towards
1 and it does not depend on λ. In other words, if Fair Trade likers are willing
to pay the value of the Fair Trade wholesale price as ethical premium, the
retailer always chooses to sell the Fair Trade variety, even if her wholesale
price is very high.
Beyond the threshold ŵf , the retailer sells only the traditional brand.
Despite of the discrimination eﬀect, the Fair Trade wholesale price is here
too high and discourage the retailer from oﬀering the Fair Trade product.
4 In or Out the Market?
In stage 2, the traditional ﬁrm and the Fair Trade certiﬁer choose simulta-
neously the wholesale prices of their respective variety, given their objective.
The certiﬁer objective is deﬁned as follows:
In strategies (FT) and (F) when the retail price of the Fair Trade product
is higher than 1 (case 2), the objective function of the Fair Trade certiﬁer is
as follows :
UFT (wf ) = UF2(wf ) = (wf )
β
(
λ(1− (1− α)wf )
2
)1−β
In strategy (F), when the retail price of the Fair Trade product is lower than
1 (case 1), the Fair Trade certiﬁer utility is
UF1(wf ) = (wf )
β
(
(1− (1− αλ)wf )
2
)1−β
These functions are concave in wf . The two ﬁrst order conditions allow us
to obtain the optimal wholesale prices for the Fair Trade certiﬁer without
11
constraint,
w∗fF =
β
1− αλ = argmaxwf UF1(wf ) and w
∗
fFT
=
β
1− α = argmaxwf UFT (wf ),
increasing in parameters α, β, and λ for w∗fF , with w
∗
fF
< w∗fFT .
To solve the game, we must ﬁnd candidate equilibria for each third stage
subgame and we need to check that no deviation is proﬁtable neither for the
traditional ﬁrm nor the Fair Trade certiﬁer.
There are two potential equilibria where the Fair Trade product is sold:
(1) one candidate where only the Fair Trade product is sold and (2) one
candidate where the Fair Trade product and the traditional product are sold.
(1) From condition (i) (see Lemma 1), the candidate equilibrium where
only the Fair Trade product is sold is such that the certiﬁer chooses wf =
Min
{
w∗fF , w˜f
}
. As w˜f strictly increases with wt, the traditional producer
has an incentive to reduce his wholesale price in order to stay in the market,
which trigger a price war (see Figure 1). There is no equilibrium where only
the Fair Trade product is sold.
(2) The candidate equilibrium strategy is such that wf = w∗fFT and wt =
1
2
. The condition (ii) (see lemma 1) implies that w∗fFT ∈ [w˜f , ŵf ] and is
equivalent to:
β˜(α, λ) < β <
1
2
(4)
where β˜(α, λ) =
(
1−α
1−α2λ
) (
2−√1+3α2λ
2
)
.
We must verify that no deviation from this candidate equilibrium strategy
is proﬁtable for both agents.
• Deviation from the traditional producer
The traditional producer may deviate by setting a lower wt such that
w∗fFT > ŵf , that is, wt < β <
1
2
. Such a deviation is proﬁtable for the
producer if and only if piTT (β) > pi
T
FT (1/2) which implies
β > β(λ) =
1−√λ
2
. (5)
If the certiﬁer favours quantities sold (low β), his optimal wholesale
price in the candidate (FT) is so low that the producer ﬁnd more prof-
itable to accommodate than to consent an important decrease in price
in order to prey the certiﬁer.
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• Deviation from the Certiﬁer
When w∗fF < w˜f , that is, β < β
′(α, λ) = 1−αλ
1−α2λ
(
2−√1+3α2λ
2
)
, the possi-
ble deviation is w∗fF . As β
′(α, λ) > β(λ), this is the only deviation to
consider. This deviation is proﬁtable if:
UF1(w
∗
fF
) > UFT (w
∗
fFT
),
that is,
β < β∗(α, λ) =
lnλ
ln [λ(1− α)]− ln (1− αλ) , (6)
with β∗(α, λ) > β˜(α, λ).13
The certiﬁer deviates from the candidate equilibrium when his prefer-
ence for the wholesale price is low (low β). In this case he can oﬀer to
the retailer a lower wholesale price for the Fair Trade product than the
traditional one and become the sole supplier.14
Results regarding the two ﬁrst stages of the game are summarized in the
following proposition 1:
Proposition 1. The certiﬁer chooses to be in the market if and only if
β∗(α, λ) < β < β(λ). The equilibrium wholesale prices are then wf = w∗fFT
and wt = 12 and the retailer sells both products.
This proposition may be interpreted as follows. As β(λ) is strictly less
than 1
2
, a certiﬁer seeking to maximize the proﬁt of the trade union would
clearly be out of the market. If the certiﬁer wants to be in the market, he
has to grant a stronger weight in his objective to the number of fair trade
producers involved rather than to the level of their premium. β∗(α, λ) is
decreasing in λ and decreasing in α and β(λ) is decreasing in λ. Thus, the
higher the Fair Trade likers' willingness to pay for a Fair Trade product, the
more likely this product is to be on the shelves of the supermarkets next to
the traditional product. Nonetheless, the eﬀect of an increase in the number
of Fair Trade likers is unclear.
Studying the condition of existence of the equilibrium leads to the follow-
ing corollary:
13Indeed, β∗(α, λ) > β˜(α, λ) because w˜f < 12 and UF1(wf ) > UFT (wf ) when wf < 1.14We don't study the case where w∗fF > w˜f , because in this case β > β
′(α, λ) > β(λ),
that is, the traditional ﬁrm never accommodates.
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Corollary 1. The range of β such that the certiﬁer chooses to be in the
market is non empty only if α ≥ α∗ (λ) with α∗ (λ) ≤ 1 ∀λ.
Proof. We show that β∗(α, λ) < β(λ) if α > α∗(λ) = 1−λ
1+
√
λ
1−√λ
1−λ
2
1−√λ
. Since λ ≤ 1,
one can see easily that α∗(λ) ≤ 1.
These results show that the most important parameter for the Fair Trade
is how much Fair Trade likers are willing to pay for a Fair Trade product. As
a consequence, if the Fair Trade certiﬁer wants to see Fair Trade products
in the shelves of supermarkets, the main consumers' characteristic, which he
has to take into account in his decision, is not the percentage of consumers
ready to buy a Fair Trade product but how much this type of consumers
are willing to pay for this product. These results are easily understandable
from the retailer's point of view. Indeed, the retailer is interested by a Fair
Trade product only if either her its wholesale price is lower than the one
of the traditional good or if she can discriminate between Fair Trade likers
and other consumers with a relatively high retail price for the Fair Trade
product. The ﬁrst one can not appear because that involves a price war with
the traditional producer and the certiﬁer thus does not want to enter in the
market. The second solution is feasible only if the Fair Trade likers give a
large enough value to the ethical characteristic of a product. Otherwise, when
the ethical premium is low, the two products are not diﬀerent enough from
the consumers' point of view and if the certiﬁer enters the market, a price
war occurs with the traditional ﬁrm. Thus, only a strong label enables the
retailer to beneﬁt from a discrimination strategy between Fair Trade likers
and traditional consumers.
At the equilibrium with the two products, the retail prices are p∗t =
3
4
and
p∗f =
1
2
+ β(1+α)
2(1−α) > 1. The retailer's proﬁt is then equal to
λ(1−β)2
4
+ (1−λ)
16
> 1
16
.
It is increasing in λ and independent of α. The traditional ﬁrm's proﬁt is
equal to 1−λ
8
and the Fair Trade likers' surplus is (1−β)
2
8
> 1
32
. When the
traditional product is the sole product sold, the retailer's proﬁt and the
traditional ﬁrm's one are respectively equal to 1
16
and 1
8
. As expected, the
loser of the entry of the Fair Trade product in supermarkets is the traditional
producer. This can explain that several traditional ﬁrms have developed
their own certiﬁcation similar to the Fair Trade label, such as chocolate
French company Cémoi with `Bio Equitable' (Organic Fair Trade) or the
partnership between Kraft and Rainforest Alliance, where the price paid to
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small producers is equal to the coﬀee spot price plus a premium. Notice that
our model represents here the case of theminimum guaranteed price. This
representation of the ethical premium related to the wholesale Fair Trade
price is not relevant in the case of the spot market price plus a premium
since the ﬂuctuations of the spot market price are confusing for consumers.
In the latter case, given the lack of visibility on the wholesale price paid to
small Fair Trade producers, it boils down to consider that consumers are
willing to pay an ethical premium deﬁned independently from the wholesale
price. We analyse this extension in the following section.
5 Robustness to a change in the premium spec-
iﬁcation
The framework is unchanged except that the ethical premium Fair Trade
likers are willing to pay for the Fair Trade product is now deﬁned by a
constant γ. Results are denoted by the superscript b. The Fair wholesale
prices thresholds are then:
w˜bf = 1−
√
γ2λ+ (1− wt)2 and ŵbf = wt + γ. (7)
The most important diﬀerence between these results and the previous
ones is that when γ tends towards 1, ŵbf tends towards 1+wt, while ŵf tends
towards +∞ when α tends towards 1. This is due to the fact that with a
demand function independent of the fair wholesale price we do not obtain
the third eﬀect, the discrimination eﬀect related to the wholesale price of the
Fair Trade product.15 This allows us to infer that the third eﬀect plays an
important role when the ethical premium parameter, α, is high.
The model with a premium independent of the wholesale price of the
Fair Trade product is more complex. However, we obtain some results with
numerical simulations.
We show (see Appendix C) that in a model with a premium independent
of the wholesale price of the Fair Trade product, there exist two thresholds,
β∗b(γ, λ) implicitly deﬁned and β
b
(γ, λ) such that
• if λ < 9%, then β∗b(γ, λ) > βb(γ, λ) and the certiﬁer does not enter in
the market ;
15Indeed, with this last demand function, ∂pi
Rb
FT (wf ,wt)
∂wf
= −λ2 [1 + γ − wf ] = −qbfFT < 0.
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• if λ > 9%, it exists an implicit γ∗(λ) such that
 if γ < γ∗(λ), β∗b(γ, λ) > β
b
(γ, λ) and the certiﬁer chooses not to
enter in the market ;
 if γ > γ∗(λ), the certiﬁer chooses to be in the market if
β∗b(γ, λ) < β < β
b
(γ, λ). (8)
In this case, the retailer buys both varieties of the good at the prices wt =
1
2
and wbfFT = β(1 + γ). For the same level of ethical premium, γ = αw
∗
fFT
,
one can see that wbfFT < w
∗
fFT
. When the demand function depends on the
wholesale price of the Fair Trade product, the certiﬁer succeeds in bargaining
a higher wholesale price for small producers.
When the ethical premium is independent of the Fair Trade product
wholesale price, results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with an
ethical premium related to the wholesale price, even if there is a lower thresh-
old for λ. In the present case, both parameters, γ and λ have to be relatively
high to obtain the equilibrium with the two varieties. Moreover, we can say,
also in this case, that the ethical premium is the most important parameter.
Indeed, the higher the Fair Trade likers' willingness to pay for a Fair Trade
product, the more likely this product is on the shelves of the supermarkets.
Once again, the eﬀect of an increase in the percentage of the Fair Trade likers
is not clear.
At the equilibrium with the two products, the retail prices are pbt =
3
4
and pbf =
(1+β)(1+γ)
2
. For the same level of ethical premium, γ = αw∗fFT ,
the equilibrium retail price is smaller when the premium do not depend on
the wholesale price ( pbf < p
∗
f ). The consumers' surplus
(
((1+γ)(1−β))2
8
)
is
increasing in γ and is greater when the premium does not depend on the
wholesale price. The retailer's proﬁt is then equal to λ(1− β) (1+γ)2
4
+ (1−λ)
16
,
increasing in γ and is greater in the case of independency. However, for the
same level of ethical premium, γ = αw∗fFT , the certiﬁer's utility is greater
when the ethical premium depends on the Fair Trade wholesale price: when
the Fair Trade likers take into account the value of small producers' revenue in
the premium they allocate to the fair characteristic of products, the certiﬁer
can extract more surplus from the retailer and consumers who adhere to the
Fair Trade concept. Indeed, he can negotiate a higher wholesale price of
the Fair Trade product. This can also explain why some retailers, such as
16
Carrefour, have tried to create their own certiﬁcation in order to suppress
the reference to a minimum price.
6 Conclusion
This article provides some arguments in the debate about the introduction of
Fair Trade products in the large-scale distribution. We have shown ﬁrst that
the certiﬁer chooses to be in the market if his objective is to favor the quantity
of small producers involved in the Fair Trade production rather than the level
of the premium they receive. However, we have shown that this premium
has to be strong enough to enable the retailer to segment consumers thanks
to the price discrimination. Besides, we have shown that even if the Fair
Trade organizations communicate a lot about the number of consumers who
are willing to pay a higher price for a Fair Trade product, the main criterion
for the introduction of this kind of good in the large-scale distribution is
rather the amount of the premium that these consumers are willing to pay,
an attribute more diﬃcult to evaluate. Econometrics analysis devoted to the
evaluation of the premium consumers are willing to pay for the fair trade
label appears as an interesting track for further research.
Finally, our results appear to be robust to a change in the speciﬁcation
of the demand function where consumers' evaluation of Fair Trade does not
depend on producers' revenue. But, with the hypothesis of the wholesale
price-dependent demand function, we show that the Fair Trade certiﬁer suc-
ceeds in negotiating a higher wholesale price of the Fair Trade product for
small producers. This suggests that Fair Trade organizations should commu-
nicate much more about the minimum price paid to small producers. This
could avoid the consumers' confusion in the choice between the internation-
ally recognized certiﬁcation (FLO) and certiﬁcations based on weaker criteria
about the wholesale price paid to small producers. On that point, it is inter-
esting to highlight the French government initiative. Before the development
of the food industries' and retailers' various initiatives in order to create their
own Fair Trade labels, French authorities have tried to draw up a standard
for the regulation of the Fair Trade market. After four years of debates be-
tween Fair Trade actors, importers, retailers, NGO, consumers, the French
norms body, AFNOR, published a reference text (Accord AC X50-340) in
January 2006 which will provide a framework for future regulation, notably
at the European level. This text retains three main principles: a balanced
17
trading relation between contractors; follow up activities in support of pro-
ducers and producers' organizations; information and awareness raising for
consumers and the general public in relation to Fair Trade. The most impor-
tant point is that reference to the minimum prices and criteria recognized by
Fair Trade international federations have to be explicitly mentioned in the
bill of the small and medium entreprises law (August 2,2006 - Article 60).
A Proof of Lemma 1
At Stage 3 of the game, the retailer chooses retail prices of products according
to her strategy.
• Strategy (FT)
The condition of positive quantity of fair product is wf < 11−α .
The retail prices are pf =
1+(α+1)wf
2
and pt = 1+wt2 and the retailer's
proﬁt is piRFT (wf , wt) = λ
(
1+αwf−wf
2
)2
+ (1− λ) (1−wt
2
)2
• Strategy (T)
pt =
1+wt
2
and piRT (wt) =
(
1−wt
2
)2
• Strategy (F)
Case 1: pf < 1
pf =
1+(αλ+1)wf
2
with pf < 1⇔ wf < 1αλ+1 = wf1 and
piRF1(wf ) =
(
1+αλwf−wf
2
)2
Case 2: pf > 1
pf =
1+(α+1)wf
2
with pf > 1⇔ wf > 1α+1 = wf2 and
piRF2(wf ) = λ
(
1+αwf−wf
2
)2
For Stage 2 of the game, we compare retailer's proﬁts, and we obtain
that:
- whatever wf , piRFT (wf , wt) > pi
R
F2(wf ),
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- if wf <
1−
√
1−(1−α2λ)wt(2−wt)
1−α2λ , pi
R
F1(wf ) > pi
R
FT (wf , wt) > pi
R
T (wt),
- if
1−
√
1−(1−α2λ)wt(2−wt)
1−α2λ < wf <
wt
1−αλ , pi
R
FT (wf , wt) > pi
R
F1(wf ) > pi
R
T (wt),
- if wt
1−αλ < wf <
wt
1−α , pi
R
FT (wf , wt) > pi
R
T (wt) > pi
R
F1(wf ),
- if wf > wt1−α , pi
R
T (wt) > pi
R
FT (wf , wt) > pi
R
F1(wf ).
Thus, the retailer's choice depends on two thresholds of the Fair Trade
product's wholesale price,
w˜f (wt, α, λ) =
1−√1− (1− α2λ)wt(2− wt)
1− α2λ and ŵf (wt, α) =
wt
1− α.
(i). If wf < w˜f , the retailer sells only the Fair Trade product at a retail
price such that all consumers buy this product (strategy (F1)).
(ii). If w˜f < wf < ŵf , then the retailer sells both products (strategy (FT)).
(iii). If wf > ŵf , then the retailer sells only the traditional product (strategy
(T)).
B Analysis of the price discrimination eﬀects
We analyze the price discrimination eﬀects deriving the retailer's proﬁt with
respect to the Fair Trade product's wholesale price.
∂piRFT (wf ,wt)
∂wf
= λ
2
[−(1− wf + αwf ) + α(1− wf + αwf )]
= [−qfFT + αqfFT ] < 0,
where qfFT denotes the quantity of Fair Trade product sold in the strategy
(FT).
The second eﬀect appears through the quantity, qf and the third eﬀect
corresponds to αqf .
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C Robustness
There are two potential equilibria where the Fair Trade product is sold: (1)
one candidate where only the Fair Trade product is sold and (2) one candi-
date where the Fair Trade product and the traditional product are sold.
(1) If wf < w˜bf , condition (i)
b (see Equation 7), the retailer sells only the
Fair Trade product with a retail price lower than unit. Hence, the candidate
equilibrium strategy is the strategy (F1) with
wf = w
∗b
fF
= β(1 + γλ) = argmax
wf
U bF1(wf ).
This candidate must respect the condition (i)b, that is,
wt > 1−
√
(1− γ
√
λ− β(1 + γλ))(1 + γ
√
λ− β(1 + γλ)) = wbt ,
and wbt exists only if β <
1−γ√λ
1+γ
√
λ
.
As in that case the traditional ﬁrm's proﬁt is null, a proﬁtable deviation
for him is to propose a wholesale price lower than wbt . Hence, in this case,
the candidate strategy is not robust to a deviation.
(2) If w˜bf < wf < ŵ
b
f Condition (ii)
b (see Equation 7), the candidate
equilibrium strategy is the strategy (F,T) with wf = w∗bfFT = β(1 + γ) =
argmax
wf
U bFT (wf ) and wt =
1
2
, because the retailer sells both products.
The condition (ii)b is equivalent to:
β˜b1(γ, λ) < β < β˜
b
2(γ), (A 1)
Where β˜b1(γ, λ) =
2−
√
1+4γ2λ
2(1+γ)
and β˜b2(γ) =
1+2γ
2(1+γ)
.
We check that no deviation from this candidate equilibrium strategy is
proﬁtable for both producers.
• Deviation from the traditional ﬁrm
The deviation for the traditional ﬁrm is to reduce wt such that w∗bfFT >
ŵbf .
Such a deviation is proﬁtable if and only if piTT (β(1 + α)− α) > piTFT (1/2),
that is, if:
β > β
b
(γ, λ), (A 2)
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with β
b
(γ, λ) = 1+2γ−
√
λ
2(1+γ)
> β(λ). The range of parameter β such
that the traditional ﬁrm deviates is narrower when the premium is
independent of the wholesale price.
The threshold β
b
(γ, λ) is increasing in γ and decreasing in λ. If the
number of Fair Trade likers is low (low λ), the traditional ﬁrm rarely
deviates from the candidate equilibrium, because by accommodating
he does not lose a lot of customers and he can oﬀer a higher whole-
sale price. If the Fair Trade likers are willing to pay less for a Fair
Trade product, all other things being equal, the traditional ﬁrm devi-
ates more frequently from the candidate equilibrium strategy. Indeed,
in this case, the certiﬁer has a less valuable asset ahead of the retailer.
The competition between the two suppliers is stronger and thus the tra-
ditional ﬁrm deviates more often from the candidate equilibrium with
the two products on the retailer's listing.
• Certiﬁer deviation
 When w∗bfF < w˜
b
f , that is,
β < β′(γ, λ) =
2−√1 + 4γ2λ
2(1 + γλ)
<
1
2
,
the possible deviation is w∗bfF .
As β < 1
2
, w∗bfF < w
∗b
fFT
< 1. In addition, it is easy to show that
when wf < 1, U bF1(wf ) > U
b
FT (wf ). Thereby,
U bF1(w
∗b
fF
) > U bF1(w
∗b
fFT
) > U bFT (w
∗b
fFT
).
Thus, when his preference for the wholesale price is relatively low,
the certiﬁer deviates from the candidate equilibrium.
 When w∗bfF > w˜
b
f , that is, β > β
′(γ, λ), the possible deviation is
w˜bf and this deviation is proﬁtable for the certiﬁer if and only if
U bF1(w˜
b
f ) > U
b
FT (w
∗b
fFT
).
Since
∗ U bFT (w∗bfFT ) is convex in β,
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∗ ∂U
b
FT (w
∗b
fFT
)
∂β
|β=1> 0,
∗ U bF1(w˜bf ) is monotonic in β,
∗ when β = β′(γ, λ), U bF1(w˜bf ) = U bF1(w∗bfF ) > U bFT (w∗bfFT ),
∗ when β = 1, U bFT (w∗bfFT ) > U bF1(w˜bf ),
There exists a unique implicit threshold β∗b(γ, λ) > β′(γ, λ) such
that
- if β < β∗b(γ, λ), the certiﬁer deviates from the candidate
equilibrium and
- if β > β∗b(γ, λ), the certiﬁer accommodates.
As w˜bf < w
∗b
fF
< w∗bfFT , β
∗b(γ, λ) decreases in γ and in λ.
As a result, the certiﬁer chooses to be in the market if and only if
β∗b(γ, λ) < β < β
b
(γ, λ) and (F,T) is the equilibrium strategy with wf =
β(1 + γ) and wt = 12 .
The range of β such that the certiﬁer chooses to be in the market is non
empty if β∗b(γ, λ) < β
b
(γ, λ).
Since β∗b(γ, λ) decreases in γ and in λ and β
b
(γ λ) decreases in γ and in
λ, β∗b(γ, λ) < β
b
(γ, λ) if and only if β∗b(1, λ) < β
b
(1, λ).
By numerical simulations, for β = β
b
(1, λ) and γ = 1, we obtain that if
λ < 0.09031, U bF1(w˜
b
f ) > U
b
FT (w
∗b
fFT
), then β∗b(γ, λ) > β
b
(γ, λ).
Finally, if λ > 0.09031, there exists an implicit γ∗(λ) such that
• if γ < γ∗(λ), β∗b(γ, λ) > βb(γ, λ) and the certiﬁer never enters in the
market ;
• if γ > γ∗(λ), the certiﬁer enters in the market if β∗b(γ, λ) < β <
β
b
(γ, λ).
References
Adriani F., Becchetti L. (2004), Fair Trade: a third generation welfare
mechanism to make globalisation sustainable, CEIS Working Paper, n. 62.
22
Allain, M-L., Chambolle C. (2003), L'Economie de la Distribution, Editions
La Découverte, collection Repères, Paris.
Alter Eco (2004), Les consommateurs français et le commerce équitable,
http://www.altereco.com.
Becchetti L., Solferino, N. (2003), On ethical product diﬀerentiation, CEIS
Working Paper , n. 188.
De Pelsmacker P., Driesen L., Rayp G. (2005), Do Consumers Care About
Ethics ? Willingness-to-Pay for Fair-Trade Coﬀee , Journal of Consumer
Aﬀairs, 39 (2): 363-385.
EFTA (European Fair Trade Association) (2001), FAIR TRADE IN EU-
ROPE 2001. Facts and Figures on the fair Trade sector in 18 European
Countries.
FTF (Fair Trade Federation) (2003), Report on Fair Trade Trends,
http://www.fairtradefederation.com
Giovannucci D. (2003), The State of Sustainable Coﬀee: A study of twelve
major markets, International Coﬀee Organization.
Immordino G. (2002), Fairness, NGO activism and the welfare of the less
developped countries, CSEF Working Paper n.101
INSEE (2004), Le commerce en 2003, INSEE Première 965, mai 2004.
Parker P.M., Soberman D.A. (2004), Private labels: psychological version-
ing of typical consumer products, International Journal of Industrial Orga-
nization, 22: 849-861.
Ramirez-Vallejo J. (2002), A Break for Coﬀee, Foreign Policy, 132: 26-27.
Raynolds L. T. (2000), Re-Embedding Global Agriculture: The Interna-
tional Organic and Fair Trade Movements, Agriculture and Human Values,
17: 297-309.
Renard M.-C. (2005), Quality certiﬁcation, regulation and power in fair
trade, Journals of Rural Studies, 21 : 419-431.
Renard M.-C. (2003), Fair Trade: quality, market and conventions, Journals
of Rural Studies, 19(1): 87-96.
23
